Ivo Skoric on Thu, 4 Oct 2001 01:07:26 +0200 (CEST)


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[Nettime-bold] Situation in Macedonia


       Statement of the Committee on Regional Cooperation on 
                     the Situation in Macedonia
                                  
The main process during the last ten years in the Balkans has 
been the dissolution of the Yugoslav state, conditioned by the 
general dissolution of Communist ideology and the political 
system on which it was based. But instead of having this process 
brought to the end in a democratic way, as happened in 
Czechoslovakia and even in the Soviet Union, parts of the old 
bureaucratic appratus reached for the integral-nationalist 
ideology in order to maintain their power. Their original 
program, personified in Milosevicíes movement, sought national 
homogenization and the establishment of nationally homogeneous 
states. This necessarily led to attempts at border changes among 
the federal units, first of all in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If we 
have learned anything at all during this period then it is that the 
destructive nationalist programs are best recognized in demands 
for the change of borders.

The response of the international community to the war conflicts 
in the countries of the former Yugoslavia was slow, peacemeal, 
and contradictory. The vacuum that occurred after the fall of 
communism and the great expectations in regard to the fast pace 
of democratization in post-Communist countries, as well as the 
lack of readiness to respond to the war conflicts with adequate 
measures, brough about a situation whereby the international 
community reacted only to the new realities, which it tried to 
pacify without going into the real causes of war. Hence the 
explanations that stressed ìage-old hate, religious and ethnic 
wars.î As in the past, old and new doreign policy alliances, as 
well as individual regional and international powers, found 
adequate space for their competition in this volatile area. Their 
inability to coordinate a common policy helped the local 
nationalist elites in finding the appropriate tactical means for 
adapting their restrictive programs and agendas.

For example, after the death of Tudjman, the new administration 
in Croatia distanced itself from the ìHerzeg-Bosniaî project, 
although a strong Tudjmanite current still exists in the 
predominantly Croat portion of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Unfortunately, the removal of Milosevic did not bring about a 
clear distancing from the satellite entity of Republika Srpska 
(RS). On the contrary, Kostunica demonstratively displays the 
Serbian strategy in regard to the RS, which did not change, and 
goes toward the unification of ìall Serb lands.î The leadership of  
RS would not be so resistant to change were it not a beneficiary 
of  Kostunicaís direct support and that of his international 
protectors.

The current crisis in Macedonia includes all the elements of 
already seen local, regional, and international ingredients in the 
war conflicts on the territories of Croatia, Bosni and 
Herzegovina, and Kosovo. That is why it is important that they 
be cleared up as soon as possible, so as to prevent the potential 
war situation, as well as its overflow into the neighboring regional 
countries.

The overriding source of the current crisis is the inequality of 
Albanians in Macedonia, where they make up a third of the total 
population. Nowadays, under the conditions of  legitimate 
resolution of the Albanian question, thus structured position of 
the Albanian community in Macedonia is entirely untenable. We 
are convinced that this question cannot be solved either by arms 
or by partition, but only by agreement on the equal participation 
of all citizens of Macedonia within a common civic state. Should 
this not be accomplished, Macedonians risk the loss of their 
country and a minimum of democratic rights. The resolution of 
the Macedonian crisis will prevent the destructive activities of 
Macedonian, Albanian, and serbian nationalists.

It is especially important to point to the role of the great powers, 
especially Russia. The only international arena where 
contemporary Russia plays a somewhat larger role is precisely 
the Balkans. Russia acts in the region through the Contact Group 
and peacekeeping operations. This gives her the opportunity ton 
retain her military presence in the Balkans. The takeover of the 
Priötina airport was especially important in this context. Russia 
greatly influenced the character of Resolution 1244, thereby 
prevehnting the definite disintegration of Yugoslavia along the 
borders that were already recognized by the Badinter 
Commission. She now supports partitions along the ethnic lines, 
primarily Slavic and Orthodox. Russia, too, has a significant 
economic influence in the Balkans, where she importuned herself 
as the source of energy. Besides this (via untransparent capital 
from the West) she influences the process of privatization in the 
Balkans.

One should not overlook the inconsistent behavior of certain 
European countries, especially France and Great Britain, which 
through the support of one party (mainly Serbian) contributed to 
the feeling that Serbia must be compensated for the loss of 
territory. This is the best illustration of international perceptions 
on the resolution of the Balkan crisis. Additional confusion is 
introduced by notable international mediators like Lord Owen, 
whose statements are frequently used in various speculations for 
the recomposition of the Balkans.

The untenable situation in Kosovo only radicalizes both Serbs 
and Albanians. It is well known that leading Serbian politicians 
are opting for the partition of Kosovo. That is why they espouse 
the maintenance of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, make 
efforts to prevent the independence of Montenegro, in hope that 
the international community will agree to their demands. In this 
context it is not unimportant to note that the border agreements 
between Serbia and Macedonia preceded the beginning of the 
conflict in Macedonia. The unresolved status of the international 
name for Macedonia shows that the resolution of the 
Macedonian question was extended ñ perhaps on account of 
possible deals with Serbs and Albanians. 

Peace in the Balkans calls for responsible leaderships that will 
agree to serious negotiations for the sake of common security ñ 
without unnecessary external tutelage and domestic selfishness. 
The road to the establishment of peace lies in the inviolability of 
borders and their maximal passableness within a regional 
customs zone in which the passage of goods and people will be 
unrestricted and unmolested. This is the only basis for the 
building of modern state communities in which ethnicity will 
become a secondary issue, but, at the same time, will not be 
imperiled. 

We take it for granted that the borders of the federal units of the 
Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia are the legal 
framework for the solution of every segment of crises in the 
countries of the former Yugoslavia. That is even today our 
common interest. That is why the maintenance of Macedonia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina is essential. These states represent 
an obstacle to the hegemonistic pretensions in the Balkans. In 
that sense they must play the role similar to Switzerland or 
Belgikum, because alternative border schemes can only be 
accomplished by prolonged wars and instability. For the same 
reasons it is essential to prevent any attempts at the partition of 
Kosovo.

								23 September 2001



Ivo Banac, Dubrovnik
Isuf Berisha, Pristina
Sonja Biserko, Beograd
Ivan Zvonimir Cicak, Zagreb
Srdjan Darmanovic, Podgorica
Jakob Finci, Sarajevo
Zdravko Grebo, Sarajevo
Enver Hoxhaj, Pristina
Suada Kapic, Sarajevo
Peter Kuzmic, Osijek
Ivan Lovrenovic, Sarajevo
Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, Sarajevo
Latinka Perovic, Beograd
Milan Popovic, Podgorica
Olga Popovic-Obradovic, Beograd
Iso Rusi, Skoplje
Obrad Savic, Beograd
Veton Surroi, Pristina
Milka Tadic, Podgorica


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