Nice read. I hate to be pedantic about numbers, but if 600,000 Serbs left Croatia, then there is no more Serbs living in Croatia, and that contradicts the recent census information, so either some Croats lied that they are Serbs, or the number of expelled Serbs used in this article is wrong.
ivo
Organization: New World Disorder
To: Direct Action <direct_action@yahoogroups.com>
From: Miroslav Visic <visic@pipeline.com>
Date sent: Sat, 01 Dec 2001 11:50:26 -0500
Send reply to: direct_action@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Direct Action >> Planning Croatia's Final Solution
[ Double-click this line for list subscription options ]
HARPER'S MAGAZINE, December 2001
READINGS
Planning Croatia's Final Solution
>From minutes of the September 12 and September 19, 1993, meetings of
the Council for Defense and National Security of the Republic of
Croatia.
That year, Croat forces murdered up to 400 Serb civilians in the town of
Gospic; in 1995 almost 600,000 Serbs were driven from the Krajina
region. This transcript is the first proof that President Franjo Tudjman
planned and directed ethnic cleansing and other war crimes. The minutes
were obtained by Chris Hedges of the New York Times. Tudjman died in
December 1999.
SEPTEMBER 12, 1993
PRESIDENT FRANJO TUDJMAN: Gentlemen, it seems that during the last few
days we have had a great military success with the Gospic operation.
At the moment when the whole world is recommending - those from the
friendly countries as well as the others - that we pursue extreme
caution and political flexibility, we nevertheless let ourselves be
drawn, both by the Serbs' provocations as well as by our own decision,
into a situation that, momentarily, no matter how we interpret it, we
have commenced an attack, which they have survived, and, given our
own preparations, that cannot be hidden. Croatia can be held to a
charge that it is preparing a war with the Serbs in Croatia.
I must admit, that this is my responsibility, as I have permitted the
Gospic operation. When General Bobetko came to me with the proposal
I took into account the Serb provocations - small provocations;
for example, their
entrance into the Velebit Range, where they killed some three special
policemen, cutting off an ear of one, then the placing of mines at
Pakrac, thereby creating a certain political climate both in the public
and the parliament - so I accepted the proposal that we are going into
this operation, although I was not informed, as I later found out, about
all the elements. For example, I knew that Divoselo is Serb, but I did
not know that all of these villages, which we conquered, were Serb.
In that way, too, considering that we were carrying on the negotiations
about a cease-fire, we brought ourselves into a situation that we can
justify only with difficulty, that at a moment when we were discussing a
cease-fire we turned to a war operation. The members of the
international community followed what is happening and why it is
happening. And then we gave them a little bit of different material. Do
not think that what General Bobetko is proposing, that we prepare two
attacks, that they do not observe this and they do not have the exact
information. And then, in addition, in our statements we brought
ourselves into a very unfortunate situation. General Bobetko, I told you
that after this operation it should be explained that they attacked
first - that is, in the Velebit - and that they did what they did, etc.
I said that one has to go before the TV cameras and show the captured
tanks.
GEN. JANKO BOBETKO: That will be this evening.
PRESIDENT: Therefore, we have to attempt to put our actions in harmony
with international policy in order to regain sovereignty over the whole
territory with international support and in a peaceful way. Of course,
I am not an illusionist to think that we shall succeed in this, but
then we should not make our tasks more difficult. We have to get ready.
PRIME MINISTER NIKICA VALENTIC: Mr. President, I have to say a word.
President, with the Serbs in Croatia we shall not solve the problem.
The only question is when is the time to solve it in another way.
PRESIDENT: Yes, I know that.
VALENTIC: Therefore, and this is something of which I want to convince
you, as a man who spent his whole life down there [in the Gospic area],
the Serbs do not accept any political solution. I think that all we need
to do is to prepare better and hit them from several sides. Thank you.
PRESIDENT: Prime Minister Valentic, with the Serbs in Croatia, those who
are now leading Knin and Baranja, no. But that is just a small group,
and they still depend on Belgrade. And the problem is, will the
international community force Belgrade to stop supplying them?
The moment when Serbia is forced to do this, then we are going to solve
the question of Serbs in Croatia. Then that miserable group of some 10
to 20 percent will leave Croatia and then we shall solve that.
And it is clear that we shall not be able to solve it. But should we
begin only with that premise, then that means war, which the world will
not permit. That is not the only focal point, only the question of
national minorities in Croatia. Such problems exist throughout the
world, in the Soviet Union, Africa, the Middle East, etc. The
international community is oriented toward the resolution of these
questions in a peaceful way - for example, as the relations between the
Arabs and Israel are being resolved - and that directs us to follow that
path, not by war; whereas in our country there is a growing
understanding that Croatia must resolve the problem by war, contrary to
international norms, meaning by ethnically cleansing the Serbs from
Croatia. That is happening in practice because we cannot hide
that they have the information that in Slavonia, western Slavonia, some
thirty Serb villages disappeared from the face of the earth, and that
now these three, four Serb villages were eradicated. This creates a
certain picture of Croatia on which we cannot build our political status
or economic relations with the world. Understand that.
VALENTIC: That is not the issue, President, but this awaits us in a
year again. It is only the question of timing. This awaits us.
PRESIDENT: Yes, if it awaits us then it means that we have to prepare
also politically, that we have to prepare ourselves better militarily,
and then we also have to prepare so that after our future operation they
will no longer be able to hit Zagreb.
VALENTIC: President, as you know, there are many mixed marriages in
Gospic; several civilians and old ladies are in Senj, where there is a
certain concentration camp, and that is where we should take those that
we captured at Citluk and Pocitelj. We should place them there in an
acceptable way and then show them off and say a few things. Because I
know this for sure - because they asked me to intervene, a granddaughter
of one of these is married to my cousin - that in Senj there is a
concentration area where you have these refugees from Citluk, Divoselo,
and Pocitelj. Then we show them that we do it in this fashion.
PRESIDENT: That would be very good, very good.
VALENTIC: And then when we display them, we pretty them up, wash them,
etc.
SEPTEMBER 19, 1993
PRESIDENT: Gentlemen, I open this meeting of the Council for Defense
and National Security with the agenda: the development of the situation
concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croat-Serb relations. In addition,
these UNPROFOR people [U.N. peacekeepers] and others tell us that we did
not have to leave the cleanest clearance behind us after we retreated.
MATE GRANIC [Foreign Minister]: That is the last news, the main news of
the last twenty-four hours on the SKY News and CNN.
BOBETKO: We turned over fifty-two, so it was said, usable Serb bodies,
and the rest were removed. There are some fifty, sixty, in the forest,
because it is more difficult to collect them in the forest. But it could
happen that they [UNPROFOR] entered a little bit too fast. However, that
was cleansed, absolutely. They cannot find anything over there, at least
I think so.
PRESIDENT: Gentlemen, to conclude, I have another obligation. Three
things:
no military actions from our side now and no provocations; prepare to
swallow, because now things are being solved in the United Nations and
it is important to know whether the Croats are for a peaceful solution
or not.
Therefore, continue the conversations with Serbs on all levels. That is
one thing. Second, Mate [Granic], in Bosnia and Herzegovina under all
circumstances carry through the agreements [with the Bosnians],
particularly everything that we did there - concentration camps, etc.,
etc.
- - - - -
[John R. MacArthur, President and Publisher of Harper's Magazine, is the
author of "Censorship and Propaganda" in the Gulf War, New York: Hill
and Wang, 1992.]
-------------------------------------
Note: During this period of Tudjman's meetings of Sept 12 and 19, 1993,
Croatian forces attacked Canadian peacekeepers in a UN-protected area,
the Medak Pocket. Medak is south of Gospic and near Pocitelj, mentioned
in the transcript of the meetings.
This battle is described in the following sources:
The Ottawa Citizen, Canada, Monday, October 7, 1996, pp. 6-7 "Canada's
Secret Battle" By DAVID PUGLIESE, CITIZEN Defence Writer
-------------------
After the Ottawa Citizen broke the story, other newspapers in Canada
printed the full story or a shorter version. The following excerpt is
from the Toronto Star summary of the battle:
The Toronto Star, Tuesday, October 15, 1996, p. A1,13
"Honor for our troops in Canada's secret battle"
OTTAWA (CP) - In 1993, Canadian soldiers fought their biggest battle
since the Korean War. The action pitted Canadian personnel and French
troops under Canadian command against the war-hardened Croatian army in
a tiny corner of the former Yugoslavia. When the shooting stopped, there
were four Canadian and seven French soldiers wounded. Croatian media put
their army's casualties at 27 dead or wounded. But until now few
Canadians outside of the military knew of the engagement or the
performance of their troops.It is
Canada's secret battle....
On Sept. 9, 1993, the Croatian army had attacked near the town of Medak
in the Krajina, an area controlled by Serbs in eastern Croatia. More
than 2,500 Croatian troops, backed by tanks, had advanced into a
35-square-kilometre area known as the Medak Pocket. After several days
of heavy fighting with the Serbs, the Croats had agreed to a UN-brokered
ceasefire that required them to pull back to their original lines.
Calvin and French Gen. Jean Cot., head of the U.N. mission, had agreed
that the Patricias would establish a buffer zone between Serb and
Croatian armies. Cot told Calvin the UN had a credibility problem and
needed a successful mission in Yugoslavia. No more would UN troops pull
back each time the Croats or Serbs attacked.
It was now time to enforce the peace.
Calvin and his men had already endured a 24-hour Croatian artillery and
mortar barrage, and some Canadians were still shaken. In Medak, where
Canadians manned an observation post, 525 bombs had landed, and four of
Calvin's soldiers had been wounded.
About noon on Sept. 15, 250 Canadian troops and 500 French soldiers
under Calvin's command started to move in between the Serb and Croat
front lines. They were supported by another 375 Canadian soldiers,
including engineers, medics and anti-tank teams. More than half the
Canadians were reservists. The Serbs watched as the UN troops advanced
but did nothing. The Croats opened fire.
Sgt. Rod Dearing's men of 8 Platoon, Charlie Company, were digging in
around the village of Sitlik when the Croats attacked.
"The whole place just lit up," said Dearing, a native of Armstrong, B.C.
"They started firing at us with everything - 20-millimetre cannon,
mortars, machine guns, everything. It was crazy." The Canadians
scrambled into their trenches and returned fire. During a second attack,
the platoon spotted the Croats. Flashes from their machineguns could be
seen from a hedgerow and
trees 150 metres away. After a fierce firefight, the shooting on the
Croatian side died down.
Dearing and his troops weren't the only Canadians fighting back. Twenty
separate gun battles would be fought that day and night with the Croats.
At 9 a.m. the following morning [Sept. 16], French troops who were in
the rear started moving forward. Backed by armored vehicles, they moved
up past the Canadians and toward the Croatian positions. By then the
Croats were
falling back. Later that morning, the Canadians heard small-arms fire
and explosions, and saw smoke rising from Serb villages behind the
Croatian lines. The Croats were killing Serb civilians.
An armored platoon started toward the burning villages but was stopped
for 90 minutes by a heavily armed Croatian unit which apparently wanted
to delay the Canadians, to enable their ethnic cleansing units to finish
their killing and looting. "That was the hardest thing - to sit there
and watch that and be essentially helpless to do anything," recalled
Calvin, who had moved up to the barricade.
Calvin didn't have the firepower to match the Croats, but he did have
another weapon: A European television crew and several Serb journalists
were with the column. Calvin gave an impromptu news conference in the
middle of the road, telling reporters the Croats were killing civilians
just on the other side of the barricade. The Croatian commander, worried
about his country's image, opened the roadblock and let the Canadians
pass.
When they finally reached the villages, the Canadians found 16 bodies of
civilian victims. Every single building in the Medak Pocket, 312 houses
and barns, had been destroyed. More than 130 large farm animals had been
slaughtered. Scattered on the ground were hundreds of pairs of surgical
gloves. It appeared that more people had been murdered and the Croats
wore the gloves when piling bodies into trucks for removal from the
area. Days later, the Croats turned over 50 bodies.
------------------------
Another source is Tested Mettle, by Scott Taylor and Brian Nolan
(Ottawa: Esprit de Corps Books, 1998), Chapter Eight, "Medak Pocket."
Cedric Thornberry, Deputy Head of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia
from 1992 to 1994, also described the Croatian war crimes in the Medak
Pocket in "Saving the War Crimes Tribunal," Foreign Policy, Fall 1996.
----------------