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| Ana Viseu on Mon, 20 Aug 2001 04:30:35 +0200 (CEST) |
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| <nettime> geography, control and hackers-Taming the web |
[Apparently we are in an age of reflection. In the last week or so the
trend has been to reflect on the internet--both on the technology and its
accompanying culture and beliefs. So, we now know that the internet is not
a-spatial or a-material, that information does not want to be free, that
the new economy is as much about property as the old one, that the new
(lack) of nature of the internet is its main feature, etc.
In this article Charles C. Mann (Technology Review) reviews this period of
reflection and summarizes and critizes with empirical examples three of Net
myths that have been long lasting in this 'information age'. These are:
Myth #1: The Internet Is Too International to Be Controlled; Myth #2: The
Net Is Too Interconnected to Control; Myth #3: The Net Is Too Filled with
Hackers to Control.
Mann's article finishes critizing hacker culture because by not recognizing
that the Net is in fact controllable, it is excluding itself from the
process of making the rules, thus allowing others to do it for them. This
echoes both Lessig's plead that the 'internet does not take care of itself'
it is everyone's 'job' to get involved in the process, and Borsook's
critique of the libertarian culture. In 'Cyberselfish' Borsook argues,
amongst others, that one of the main faults of libertarian culture is that
by denying that politics are useful for anything its proponents do not know
how to use it for their own sake and end up being left out of the loop.
Best. Ana]
http://www.techreview.com/magazine/sep01/mann.asp
Technology Review, September 2001
By Charles C. Mann
Taming the Web
"Information wants to be free." "The Internet can't be controlled." We've
heard it so often that we sometimes take for granted that it's true. But
THE INTERNET CAN BE CONTROLLED, and those who argue otherwise are hastening
the day when it will be controlled too much, by the wrong people, and for
the wrong reasons.
Last December, Vincent Falco, a 28-year-old game programmer in West Palm
Beach, FL, released version 1.0 of a pet project he called BearShare.
BearShare is decentralized file-sharing softwarethat is, it allows
thousands of Internet users to search each other's hard drives for files
and exchange them without any supervision or monitoring. Released free of
charge, downloaded millions of times, BearShare is a raspberry in the face
of the music, film and publishing industries: six months after the release
of version 1.0, tens of thousands of songs, movies, videos and texts were
coursing through the network every day. Because the software links together
a constantly changing, ad hoc collection of users, Falco says, "there's no
central point for the industries to attack." BearShare, in other words, is
unstoppable.
Which, to Falco's way of thinking, is entirely unsurprisingalmost a matter
of course. BearShare is just one more example, in his view, of the way that
digital technology inevitably sweeps aside any attempt to regulate
information. "You can't stop people from putting stuff on the Net," Falco
says. "And once something is on the Net you can't stop it from spreading
everywhere."
The Internet is unstoppable! The flow of data can never be blocked! These
libertarian claims, exemplified by software like BearShare, have become
dogma to a surprisingly large number of Internet users. Governments and
corporations may try to rein in digital technology, these people say, but
it simply will never happen because...information wants to be free.
Because, in a phrase attributed to Internet activist John Gilmore, the Net
treats censorship as damage and routes around it. Laws, police, governments
and corporationsall are helpless before the continually changing, endlessly
branching, infinitely long river of data that is the Net.
To the generations nurtured on 1984, Cointelpro and The Matrix, the image
of a global free-thought zone where people will always be able to say and
do what they like has obvious emotional appeal. Little wonder that the
notion of the Net's inherent uncontrollability has migrated to the
mainstream media from the cyberpunk novels and technoanarchist screeds
where it was first articulated in the late 1980s. A leitmotif in the
discussion of the Napster case, for example, was the claim that it was
futile for the recording industry to sue the file-swapping company because
an even more troublesome file-swapping system would inevitably emerge. And
the rapid appearance of BearSharealong with LimeWire, Audiogalaxy, Aimster
and a plethora of other file-swapping programsseemed to bear this out.
Nonetheless, the claim that the Internet is ungovernable by its nature is
more of a hope than a fact. It rests on three widely accepted beliefs, each
of which has become dogma to webheads. First, the Net is said to be too
international to oversee: there will always be some place where people can
set up a server and distribute whatever they want. Second, the Net is too
interconnected to fence in: if a single person has something, he or she can
instantly make it available to millions of others. Third, the Net is too
full of hackers: any effort at control will invariably be circumvented by
the world's army of amateur tinkerers, who will then spread the workaround
everywhere.
Unfortunately, current evidence suggests that two of the three arguments
for the Net's uncontrollability are simply wrong; the third, though likely
to be correct, is likely to be irrelevant. In consequence, the world may
well be on the path to a more orderly electronic futureone in which the
Internet can and will be controlled. If so, the important question is not
whether the Net can be regulated and monitored, but how and by whom.
The potential consequences are enormous. Soon, it is widely believed, the
Internet will become a universal library/movie theater/voting
booth/shopping mall/newspaper/museum/concert halla 21st-century version of
the ancient Greek agora, the commons where all the commercial, political
and cultural functions of a democratic society took place. By insisting
that digital technology is ineluctably beyond the reach of authority, Falco
and others like him are inadvertently making it far more likely that the
rules of operation of the worldwide intellectual commons that is the
Internet will be established not through the messy but open processes of
democracy but by private negotiations among large corporations. To think
this prospect dismaying, one doesn't need to be a fan of BearShare.
Myth #1: The Internet Is Too International to Be Controlled
At first glance, Swaptor seems like something out of a cyberpunk novel. A
secretive music-swapping service much like Napster, it seems specifically
designed to avoid attacks from the record labels. The company is
headquartered in the Caribbean island nation of St. Kitts and Nevis. Its
founders are deliberately anonymous to the public; its sole address is a
post-office box in the small town of Charlestown, Nevis. Swaptor's creators
seem confident that the company can survive beyond national lawsafter all,
the Internet is too spread across the world to control, right?
Indeed, Swaptor does seem protected. Nevis, according to company
representative John Simpson, "has excellent corporate laws for conducting
international business." He is apparently referring to the happy fact that
Nevis has not ratified either the World Intellectual Property Organization
Copyright Treaty or the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, both of
which extend international copyright rules to the Internet. As a result,
Swaptor appears not to be breaking local or international law.
The founders of Swaptor "wish to remain anonymous at this time," according
to Simpson. They won't need to reveal themselves to raise money: the
company is headquartered in an offshore bank called the Nevis International
Trust. Affiliated with the bank is a successful online gambling concern,
Online Wagering Systems. Supported by advertising, Simpson claims, Swaptor
has been profitable since its launch in February.
In the imagination of Net enthusiasts, offshore havens like Nevis are
fervid greenhouses in which this kind of suspect operation can flower. But
can it?
Napster at its peak had a million and a half simultaneous users, generating
a huge amount of data traffic; the company established itself in Silicon
Valley, where it could gain access to the infrastructure it needed to
handle this barrage of connections. Swaptor, in contrast, is headquartered
in Nevis. The sole high-capacity Net pipeline to Nevis is provided by the
Eastern Caribbean Fibre-Optic System, which snakes through 14 island
nations between Trinidad, off the Venezuelan coast, and Tortola, near
Puerto Rico. Yet this recently installed system, though it is being
upgraded, has a limited capacitynot enough to push through the wash of
zeroes and ones generated by a large file-swapping service. Which, one
assumes, is why the "offshore" service of Swaptor is actually situated
in...Virginia.
Should the recording industry decide to sue Swaptor, it wouldn't need to
rely on the company or on Technology Review to get this information; widely
available software can trace Swaptor traffic and discover that Swaptor's
central index of available files is located on five servers that sit just a
few miles from the Washington, DC, headquarters of the Recording Industry
Association of America. (Two common monitoring programs, Traceroute and
Sniffer, can be downloaded gratis from thousands of Web sites.) Not only
that, Swaptor's Web sitethe site from which users download the programis
hosted by a Malaysian company with an explicit policy against encouraging
copyright infringement.
As Swaptor shows, the Net can be accessed from anywhere in theory, but as a
practical matter, most out-of-the-way places don't have the requisite
equipment. And even if people do actually locate their services in a remote
land, they can be easily discovered. "I don't think most people realize how
findable things are on the Net," says David Weekly, the software engineer
and Net-music veteran who tracked down Swaptor's servers for this magazine
in a few minutes. "With simple software...you can find out huge amounts of
information about what people are doing in almost no time."
Once international miscreants are discovered, companies and governments
already have a variety of weapons against themand soon will have more.
According to Ian Ballon of the Silicon Valley law firm Manatt, Phelps and
Phillips, who serves on the American Bar Association committee on
cyberspace law, even if offshore firms are legal in their home bases, their
owners "have to be willing to not come back to the United States." Not only
do they risk losing any assets in this country, but U.S. businesses that
deal with them will also be at risk. "Any revenue the offshore business
sends to them could be subject to attachment," says Ballon.
In the future, moreover, the reach of national law will increase. The Hague
Conference on Private International Law is developing an international
treaty explicitly intended to make outfits like Swaptor more vulnerable to
legal pressure"a bold set of rules that will profoundly change the
Internet," in the phrase of James Love, director of the activist Consumer
Project on Technology. (The draft treaty will be discussed at a diplomatic
meeting next year.) By making it possible to apply the laws of any one
country to any Internet site available in that country, the draft treaty
will, Love warns, "lead to a great reduction in freedom, shrink the public
domain, and diminish national sovereignty."
Rather than being a guarantee of liberty, in other words, the global nature
of the Net is just as likely to lead to more governmental and corporate
control.
Myth #2: The Net Is Too Interconnected to Control
Before BearShare came Gnutella, a program written by Justin Frankel and Tom
Pepper. Frankel and Pepper were the two lead figures in Nullsoft, a tiny
software firm that America Online purchased in June 1999 for stock then
worth about $80 million. Rather than resting on their laurels after the
buyout, Frankel and Pepper became intrigued by the possibilities of file
swapping that arose in the wake of Napster. When college network
administrators tried to block Napster use on their campuses, Frankel and
Pepper spent two weeks throwing together Gnutella, file-swapping software
that they thought would be impossible to block. They released an
experimental, unfinished version on March 14, 2000. To their surprise,
demand was so immediate and explosive that it forced the unprepared Pepper
to shut down the Web site almost as soon as it was launched. Within hours
of Gnutella's release, an embarrassed AOL pulled the plug on what it
characterized as an "unauthorized freelance project."
It was too late. In an example of the seeming impossibility of stuffing the
Internet cat back into the bag, thousands of people had already downloaded
Gnutella. Amateur programmers promptly reverse-engineered the code and
posted non-AOL versions of Gnutella on dozens of new Gnutella Web sites.
Unlike Napster or Swaptor, Gnutella lets every user directly search every
other user's hard drive in real time. With member computers connecting
directly to each other, rather than linking through powerful central
servers, these "peer-to-peer" networks have no main hub, at least in
theory. As a result, there is no focal point, no single point of failure,
no Gnutella world headquarters to sue or unplug. "Gnutella can withstand a
band of hungry lawyers," crows the Gnutella News Web site. "It is
absolutely unstoppable."
Peer-to-peer networks have a number of important advantages, such as the
ability to search for documents in real time, as opposed to looking for
them in the slowly compiled indexes of search engines such as Google and
HotBot. Excited by these possibilities, such mainstream firms as Intel and
Sun Microsystems have embraced peer-to-peer network technology. But the
focus of interest, among both the proponents and critics of peer-to-peer
networks, has been the purported impossibility of blocking them. "The only
way to stop [Gnutella]," declared Thomas Hale, former CEO of the Web-music
firm WiredPlanet, "is to turn off the Internet."
Such arguments have been repeated thousands of times in Internet mailing
lists, Web logs and the press. But the claims for peer-to-peer's
uncontrollability don't take into consideration how computers interact in
the real world; a network that is absolutely decentralized is also
absolutely dysfunctional. In consequence, the way today's Gnutella networks
actually work is quite different from the way they have been presented in
theory.
To begin, each Gnutella user isn't literally connected to every other
userthat would place impossibly high demands on home computers. Instead,
Gnutellites are directly connected to a few other machines on the network,
each of which in turn is connected to several more machines, and so on. In
this way, the whole network consists of hundreds or thousands of
overlapping local clusters. When users look for a file, whether it is a
copy of the Bible, a bootleg of A.I. or smuggled documents on the Tiananmen
massacre, they pass the request to their neighbors, who search through the
portion of their hard drives that they have made available for sharing. If
the neighbors find what is being looked for, they send the good news back
to the first machine. At the same time, they pass on the search request to
the next computer clusters in the Gnutella network, which repeat the process.
Hopping through the network, the search is repeated on thousands of
machineswhich leads to big problems. According to a report in December by
Kelly Truelove of Clip2, a Palo Alto, CA-based consulting group that
specializes in network-performance analysis, a typical Gnutella search
query is 70 bytes long, equivalent to a very small computer file. But there
are a great many of themas many as 10 per second from each machine to which
the user is connected.
In addition, there is a constant flow of "ping" messages: the digital
equivalent of "are you there?" Inundated by these short messages, the 56
kilobit-per-second modems through which most people connect to the Net are
quickly overwhelmed by Gnutella. Broadband connections help surprisingly
little; the speed with which the network processes requests is governed by
the rate at which its slowest members can pass data through.
With BearShare, Vinnie Falco developed one potential fix. BearShare, like
other new Gnutella software, automatically groups users by their ability to
respond to queries, ensuring that most network traffic is routed through
faster, more responsive machines. These big servers are linked into
"backbone" chains that speed along most Gnutella search requests. Further
unclogging the network, Clip2 has developed "reflectors"large servers,
constantly plugged into the Gnutella network, that maintain indexes of the
files stored on adjacent machines. When reflectors receive search queries,
they don't pass them on to their neighbors. Instead they simply answer from
their own memories"yes, computer X has this file." Finally, to speed the
process of connecting to Gnutella, several groups have created "host
caches," servers that maintain lists of the computers that are on the
Gnutella network at a given time. When users want to log on, they simply
connect with these host caches and select from the list of connected
machines, thus avoiding the slow, frustrating process of trying to
determine who else is online.
As their capacity improved, Gnutella-like networks soared in popularity.
Napster, buffeted by legal problems, saw traffic decline 87 percent between
January and May, according to the consulting firm Webnoize. Meanwhile,
LimeWire, another Gnutella company, reported that the number of Gnutella
users increased by a factor of 10 in the same period. "The networks are
unclogging, and as a result they're growing," Truelove says. "And the
content industries should be concerned about that."
But the problem with these fixes is that they reintroduce hierarchy.
Gnutella, once decentralized, now has an essential backbone of important
computers, Napster-like central indexes and permanent entryway servers.
"We've put back almost everything that people think we've left out," says
Gene Kan, a programmer who is leading a peer-to-peer project at Sun. "Ease
of use always comes at some expense, and in this case the expense is that
you do have a few points of failure that critically affect the ability to
use the network."
Rather than being composed of an uncontrollable, shapeless mass of
individual rebels, Gnutella-type networks have identifiable, centralized
targets that can easily be challenged, shut down or sued. Obvious targets
are the large backbone machines, which, according to peer-to-peer
developers, can be identified by sending out multiple searches and
requests. By tracking the answers and the number of hops they take between
computers, it is possible not only to identify the Internet addresses of
important sites but also to pinpoint their locations within the network.
Once central machines have been identified, companies and governments have
a potent legal weapon against them: their Internet service providers.
"Internet service providers enjoy limitations on liability for their users'
actions if they do certain things specified by law," says Jule Sigall, an
Arnold and Porter lawyer who represents copyright owners. "If you tell them
that their users are doing something illegal, they can limit their exposure
to money damages if they do something about it when they are notified."
Internet service providers, he says, do not want to threaten their
customers, "but they like not being sued even more, so they've been
cooperating pretty wholeheartedly" with content owners.
As Ballon of Manatt, Phelps and Phillips notes, Gnutella traffic has a
distinctive digital "signature." (More technically, the packets of Gnutella
data are identified in their headers.) Content companies are also learning
how to "tag" digital files. The result, in Ballon's view, is easy to
foresee: "At a certain point, the studios and labels and publishers will
send over lists of things to block to America Online, and 40 percent of the
country's Net users will no longer be able to participate in Gnutella. Do
the same thing for EarthLink and MSN, and you're drastically shrinking the
pool of available users." Indeed, the governments of China and Saudi Arabia
have successfully pursued a similar strategy for political ends.
Perhaps sensing that Gnutella cannot escape the eye of authority,
bleeding-edge hackers have searched for still better solutions. Determined
to create a free-speech haven, a Scottish activist/programmer named Ian
Clarke in 1999 began work on a Gnutella-like network called Freenet that
would be even more difficult to control, because it would encrypt all files
and distribute them in chunks that constantly shifted location.
Unsurprisingly, it has attracted enormous media attention. But the system
is so incompletesearchability is an issuethat one cannot judge whether it
will ever be widely used. (A small number of people are already using
Freenet. Most of them are pornography fans, but a few, according to Clarke,
are Chinese dissidents who employ Freenet to escape official scrutiny.)
Even if Freenet does not end up in the crowded graveyard of vaporware,
Internet service providers can always pull the plugtreating Freenet, in
essence, as an unsupported feature, in the way that many providers today do
not support telnet, Usenet and other less popular services.
Myth #3: The Net Is Too Filled with Hackers to Control
It was a classic act of hubris. The Secure Digital Music Initiative, a
consortium of nearly 200 technology firms and record labels, thought the
software it had developed to block illegal copying of music was so good
that last September it issued an "open letter to the digital community"
daring hackers to try their best to break it. The result was a fiasco.
Within three weeks, at least four teams broke the code, and hacks were soon
distributed widely across the Internet. In the folklore of the Net, the
initiative's challenge became one more example of a general truth: any
method of controlling digital information will fail, because someone will
always find a way around itand spread the hack around the Internet.
"There are no technical fixes," says Bruce Schneier, cofounder of
Counterpane Internet Security. "People have tried to lock up digital
information for as long as computer networks have existed, and they have
never succeeded. Sooner or later, somebody has always figured out how to
pick the locks."
But software is not the only means of controlling digital information: it's
also possible to build such controls into hardware itself, and there are
technical means available today to make hardware controls so difficult to
crack that it will not be practical to even try. "I can write a program
that lets you break the copy protection on a music file," says Dan Farmer,
an independent computer security consultant in San Francisco. "But I can't
write a program that solders new connections onto a chip for you."
In other words, those who claim that the Net cannot be controlled because
the world's hackers will inevitably break any protection scheme are not
taking into account that the Internet runs on hardwareand that this
hardware is, in large part, the product of marketing decisions, not
technological givens. Take, for example, Content Protection for Recordable
Media, a proposal issued late last year by IBM, Intel, Toshiba and
Matsushita Electric (see "The End of Free Music?" TR April 2001). The four
companies developed a way to extend an identification system already used
in DVDs and DVD players to memory chips, portable storage devices and,
conceivably, computer hard drives. Under this identification scheme, people
who downloaded music, videos, or other copyrighted material would be able
to play it only on devices with the proper identification codes.
In addition to restricting unauthorized copies, it was widely reported that
the technology also had the potential to interfere with other, less
controversial practices, such as backing up files from one hard drive onto
another. In part because of controversy surrounding the technology, the
companies withdrew the plan from consideration as an industrywide standard
in February. But the point is clear: the technology has been tabled because
its promoters believed it wasn't profitable, not because it would not work.
This and other hardware schemes have the potential to radically limit what
people can do with networking technology.
Some hardware protection methods already exist. Stephen King released his
e-book Riding the Bullet in March 2000, in what were effectively two
different versions: a file that could be read only on specialized
electronic deviceselectronic booksand a file that could be read on computer
monitors. Even though the text was available for free at Amazon.com, some
people went to the trouble of breaking the encryption on the computer file
anyway; distributed from Switzerland, it was available on the Internet
within three days. But the electronic-book version was never cracked,
because e-books, unlike computers, cannot do two things at once. "On a
computer, you can always run one program to circumvent another," says
Martin Eberhard, former head of NuvoMedia, the developer of the Rocket
eBook. "If a book is on a computer screen, it exists in video memory
somewhere, and someone will always be able to figure out how to get at it."
Eberhard's e-books, by contrast, were deliberately designed to make
multitasking impossible. True, future e-books could, like computers,
perform two tasks simultaneously, but publishers could refuse to license
electronic books to their manufacturers, in much the same way that film
studios refuse to allow their content to be used on DVD machines that don't
follow certain rules. And even computers themselves, in Eberhard's view,
could be "rearchitected," with added hardware that performs specific,
controlling tasks. "If people have to rip up their motherboards to send
around free music," he says, "there will be a lot less free music on the
Net....It would be an ugly solution, but it would work."
Of course, consumers will avoid products that are inconvenient. A leading
example is digital audio tape recorders, which by law are burdened with so
many copy protection features that consumers generally have rejected them.
But to assume that companies involved with digital media cannot come up
with an acceptable and effective means of control is to commit, in reverse,
the same act of hubris that the Secure Music Digital Initiative did, when
it assumed that clever people couldn't break its software. And if the
hardware industry resists making copy-protected devices, says Justin
Hughes, an Internet-law specialist at the University of California, Los
Angeles, an appeal to Congress may be "just a matter of time." If the
Internet proves difficult to control, he says, "you will see legislation
mandating that hardware adhere to certain standard rules, just like we
insist that cars have certain antipollution methods."
"To say that a particular technology guarantees a kind of anarchic utopia
is just technological determinism," he says. "This argument should be
ignored, because the real question is not whether the Net will be tamed,
but why and how we tame it."
We are in the beginning stages of the transfer of most of society's
functionsworking, socializing, shopping, acting politicallyfrom what
Internet denizens jokingly call "meatspace" into the virtual domain. In the
real world, these functions are wrapped in a thicket of regulations and
cultural norms that are, for the most part, accepted. Some free-speech
absolutists dislike libel laws, but it is generally believed that the
chilling effect on discourse they exert is balanced by their ability to
punish gratuitous false attacks on private individuals. Regulations on the
Net need not be any more obnoxious. "If the whole neighborhood's online,
it's okay to have a cop on the beat," says Schneier.
The risk, of course, is overreachingof using law and technology to make the
Internet a locus of near absolute control, rather than near absolute freedom.
Paradoxically, the myth of unfettered online liberty may help bring this
undesirable prospect closer to reality. "Governments are going to set down
rules,"
says Hughes, "and if you spend all your time fighting the existence of
rules you won't have much chance to make sure the rules are good ones."
In other words, hackers may be their own worst enemies. By claiming that
the Net is inherently uncontrollable, they are absenting themselves from
the inevitable process of creating the system that will control it. Having
given up any attempt to set the rules, they are unavoidably allowing the
rules to be set for them, largely by business. Corporations are by no means
intrinsically malign, but it is folly to think that their interests will
always dovetail with those of the public. The best way to counterbalance
Big Money's inevitable, even understandable, efforts to shape the Net into
an environment of its liking is through the untidy, squabbling process of
democratic governancethe exact process rejected by those who place their
faith in the endless ability of anonymous hackers to circumvent any
controls. An important step toward creating the kind of online future we
want is to abandon the persistent myth that information wants to be free.
Charles Mann has written for Technology Review about the free software
movement (January/February 1999) and the use of genetic engineering in
agriculture (July/August 1999).
----++++----++++----
Tudo vale a pena se a alma não é pequena.
http://fcis.oise.utoronto.ca/~aviseu
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