patrice on Tue, 4 Sep 2001 20:39:20 +0200 (CEST) |
[Date Prev] [Date Next] [Thread Prev] [Thread Next] [Date Index] [Thread Index]
<nettime> Pierre Khalfa (ATTAC-France) on violence & the movement after Genoa |
bwo the coorditrad (translaters pool) of Attac.org, with thanks. After Genoa, a few thoughts on violence and the current state of the movement . Pierre Khalfa . After Gothenburg, the Genoa demonstrations raised the issue of the relationship with violence once again . Capitalism, like all other systems based on one class's domination over the whole of society, was established using violence. It has built a system of domination that has used violence in different ways according to the period and circumstances: direct violence and attempts at finding a consensus to hide the system's oppressive brutality, each great social advance being won in more or less violent confrontation . A tactical deadlock . Historically, the decision to use or refuse violence to fight this system on a daily basis has been determined by an overall "tactical" approach. It is therefore important to take a look at these disputes before re-examining the current situation . >From the outset, the workers' movement was divided as to the kind of response it should give. Two main approaches appeared. One aimed at a gradual build-up of peaceful actions to gain positions of strength throughout society over time, thus coming to power and in this way imposing radical changes on the dominant classes. In this framework, violence could only be defensive, in the event of "bourgeois provocation", or as a final boost if the bourgeoisie could not admit defeat. The other approach was to say that, since the dominant classes had never given up the slightest iota of power without a fight, confrontation was inevitable - all the more so since the State apparatus was growing stronger each day, and they should therefore prepare both it and "the masses" consciously . Neither of these approaches has worked. The first, applied in a sincere way, has led to tragedy - the most recent case being the Chile of Popular Unity, or has mostly just been a pretext for accepting the system and has even been used to justify repressing the most radical forces. The second approach has also failed, ending in bloodshed, and its successes were short-lived. If the breakdown of the Russian, Chinese, Cuban, etc. revolutions cannot be explained by this single factor alone, their particular relationship with violence played a significant role. In addition, theorising violence, or even acclaiming it, has day-to-day consequences on people's behaviour and on the culture developed in the organisations that use it. It does not co-exist easily with open debate and setting up democratic processes . Violence is not a neutral technical means. It has consequences on those who use it, on the society that promotes it and unavoidably dominates any other social relationships. It is misguided to believe that it can be contained "elsewhere" and not affect those who use it. The idea that violence can only be used against the dominant classes is largely an illusion and "no violence in the workers' movement" has, historically, been nothing more than a pious hope. In the same way, the Maoist distinction between "contradictions among the people" which are supposed to be solved peacefully and "contradictions between the people and its enemies", where violence could be used does not solve any problems: who decides who belongs to the people? Inevitably the use of violence against the dominant has consequences on the dominated themselves and grows amongst them . However, upholding non-violence does not solve our problems. Saying that you are non-violent does not mean that your opponents are too. The Gandhian non-violence experience met with numerous massacres by the British Army and did not prevent the Indians from killing each other subsequently. In addition, everyone knows that many peaceful demonstrations have been and still are subject to government repression, Genoa being the most recent example . This brief appraisal of the past brings us to the very heart of current problem. We must build up a new tactical outlook, and can only do this on the basis of the current state of movements and by taking onboard the debates of the past. We would be deluding ourselves to believe that capitalism would, without reacting violently, accept having measures imposed on it that radically question how it works. How can we prepare ourselves for this violence, how should we respond? Today there is no clear answer to these questions. This is the tactical deadlock that is complicating today's debates and making them hard to understand . The current state of the movement as a starting point . Since Seattle, the movement against neo-liberal globalisation has grown considerably. This has affected both the periodicity and extent of mobilisations and has brought increasing radicalisation, amongst the young in particular. But, and this is the main point, these mobilisations are only the precursor of an overall shift in public opinion, at least in capitalistic developed countries. Not only are these movements gaining in strength, but they are also starting to resonate with the concerns of increasing segments of the population. The risk of a recession, far from undermining this shift, is speeding up awareness (for the time being?), as can be seen from the reaction to "stock-market job cuts". This growing echo to issues borne by the movement has put governments on the ideological defensive and hastened the international institutions' legitimacy crisis, even if it has not made them change course at all. This ever-closer link with public opinion is the biggest danger for governments, the link they want to break . This is the context, after Gothenburg, in which we must situate Berlusconi's attitude at the Genoa summit. Beyond the foul-ups that any police operation leads to, the Italian government (with the support of other governments?) chose to attack all members of the movement without distinction. In this way they could both criminalize the whole movement, with the hope of marginalizing it in the public eye, and divide its members in an attempt to integrate its most moderate supporters. It was not the Black Block's attitude that led to police violence, but a political choice made by the Italian government. Had the Black Block not been there, there is no doubt that the government would have found another pretext . The visible nature of police provocation, however, and the very extent of the repression had the opposite effect to that sought by the Italian government. The government's attitude was condemned by organisations which had not even called their members to Genoa and, far from marginalising the movement, amplified it. This strengthened its impact on public opinion, and even more so when the Italian courts' first charges confirmed the idea of police provocation. The movement's strength led to a change in tone by most governments, forced to condemn police violence and to recognise that the problems raised by the demonstrators were legitimate, even if they do not seem willing to adopt the slightest concrete measure. In France, the Socialist Party (PS) is divided on this issue: MP Jean-Marie Bockel sees no common ground with Genoa demonstrators and is opposed to PS spokesperson Vincent Peillon and government MP Christian Paul, who support them (on the eve of the elections it is best not to alienate public opinion!). With the indirect consequence of the movement now carrying even more weight in public opinion . Given this situation, we must at the same time fulfil 4 aims. Firstly we must maintain and strengthen the link with public opinion. Secondly we must avoid the movement breaking up. Thirdly we must be capable of assuming its increasingly radical nature. Finally we must continue to organise massive demonstrations to show its strength . Fulfilling these aims necessarily means avoiding a certain number of stumbling blocks. Firstly we must avoid going to extremes as regards our choice of action that some might justify by governments' autism. This refusal is decisive if we do not want governments to win points in their attempt to destroy the public support we currently enjoy, whence our choice of non-violence. But at the same time this refusal must be accompanied by our taking charge of the increasing radicalisation of part of the movement . This means choosing forms of action that incorporate this radicalism symbolically. In the face of the system's violence, the choice of non-violence can be neither synonym to passiveness nor automatic acceptance of its legality, whence the "active" nature of our recourse to non-violence . The emergence over the last few years of radical non-violent forms of action taken by a number of social movements - unemployed people taking over French unemployment offices, or homeless people taking over empty accommodation, for example - has made it possible for those concerned to express their exasperation powerfully and give their cause visibility whilst at the same time having a positive impact on public opinion. We must take inspiration from this. The more we affirm the non-violent nature of our actions, the more we must present our determination through the appropriate forms of action that must be discussed on a case-by-case basis . We must position our relationship with the Black Block within this framework. Even if it is not a structured group but rather a faction of varying dimensions, it represents the tactic of choosing systematic violent confrontation with the Police and the destruction of the "symbols of capitalism" (bank branches, cars, etc.). This tactic is justified by "destroying property as a tactical means of direct action", by the aim of creating "liberated autonomous zones" and by the need to waken a sleeping population by unmasking the repressive face of the State. We must say clearly that this tactic is not ours. It can bring only the movement's marginalisation and isolation and favours all types of manipulation . However, it would be a mistake to reject this current as alien to our movement and consider it as simply a bunch of agitators. Firstly because, whether we like it or not, governments will assimilate us with them and our protestations will do nothing to change that... other than make a radical change to our forms of action by adapting to what governments are willing to accept. That kind of tactic would seal the movement's break-up and sign its death warrant. Secondly since this faction may attract a certain number of people who are sickened by the system and who really think that they can change things in that way. Thirdly and, in particular, because any brutal rejection of this current can only lead to an even greater radicalisation which might lead to a Red-Brigade logic being implemented, which would be used by governments against all social movements. The experience of Germany and Italy at the end of 70s are illuminating on these points. Finally because their attitude can vary: it was not the same in Washington (April, 2000) and in Quebec as in Genoa (possibly because the groups that bore the name were not the same). We are therefore at a watershed: we must both state clearly that the Black Block's methods and tactics are not ours, and at the same time not reject them but initiate a political dialogue with them . A few ideas . The debate on forms of action, of which the use of violence is only part, is running through the whole movement. We must assume and structure it so that it becomes a factor for political homogenisation. In this context, we must work on an international text on these questions that could be adopted after being debated by the various members of our movement. This reference text could be used as a charter for the various movements and include a number of concrete commitments . In this context, we must discuss how our processions should be protected and ensure our right to demonstrate. We must be aware that the first and most effective protection is that provided by the movement's political force and its legitimacy in public opinion. However, this does not mean that we must underestimate the question. Although we must avoid any militarisation of our processions which, apart from giving an illusion of effectiveness, would fudge our image, we must also be capable of building up a supportive framework sufficiently reassuring to enable massive participation in our initiatives by setting up a contingent with a means of defence . Proposals are being made that aim to bridge the gap between the movement and the Institutions. French Green Euro-MP Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Le Monde, 11th August, 2001) suggests a sort of compromise for demonstrations during the next European Union Summit. With the belief that this meeting has a democratic legitimacy that the G8 did not have, he proposes giving them the possibility of meeting together without any problems in exchange for there being no red zones and there being a total freedom to demonstrate. A "demilitarised zone" would be created with no police, protected peacefully by 2000 "citizen leaders" (MPs, association leaders, union leaders, etc.) . This proposal acknowledges implicitly that summits are not all equally legitimate (whatever one might think of his statement on the EU's democratic legitimacy) and therefore that some are not justified. It questions the bunkerisation of these meetings and acknowledges the negative role of the Police. However, it does raise a number of problems. Firstly, one might doubt that governments will accept the idea of a summit with no police protection or demonstrator-prohibited zones. There is therefore a great risk of these "citizen leaders" becoming police ancillaries to stop demonstrators entering the prohibited zone. Basically, this proposal aims at making us responsible for security at the meetings of institutions whose tactics we oppose. Is that our role? Moreover, who will decide on the legitimacy of such and such summit or institution? . Beyond the action issue, we must expand our alternative suggestions. Today we have a number of limited suggestions. We must make them coherent as a whole and in particular ensure that they are accepted by public opinion. This approach is all the more important in that the credibility of our actions will largely depend on these concerns, given that governments and international institutions want to confine us to the role of "nice, pleasant people who pose real problems but have no real solutions" . Finally, we must discuss rapidly the two significant events that are coming up : the WTO meeting in Qatar in November and the new EU Summit in Laeken in Belgium in December . August 2001 . Translation by Amanda Brazier-Galbe -- Philippe Manet sauf avis contraire dans le corps du message, pour votre sécurité, n'ouvrez pas les pièces jointes ! For your security, never open an attachement unless clearly stated in the mail ! Zu Ihrer Computersicherheit: Öffnen Sie keine Anlage, wenn diese nicht im Anschreiben ausdrücklich erwähnt worden # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: majordomo@bbs.thing.net and "info nettime-l" in the msg body # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime@bbs.thing.net