www.nettime.org Nettime mailing list archives
| Nicholas J. Kiersey on Sat, 19 Jul 2008 00:41:40 +0200 (CEST) |
[Date Prev] [Date Next] [Thread Prev] [Thread Next] [Date Index] [Thread Index]
| <nettime> Informal Review of New Soros Book |
http://www.amazon.com/New-Paradigm-Financial-Markets/dp/B00171KGFK/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1216067916&sr=1-1
Dear Nettimers,
Having seen Soros's name mentioned a couple of times recently on this
list, and following the chat about inflation, I picked up a copy of
his new book this week, 'The New Paradigm'. Its a little bit self-
involved, but if you can get past this, its actually quite worth the
effort. Anyway, I am thinking of writing a review of it but, given the
topical nature, I thought I'd share some of my initial thoughts about
the book with yourselves, first.
The basic argument is that blame for the current debt crisis should be
lain squarely at the feet of modern economic theory, and its misguided
belief that it is a 'science'. The idea that economics is a science is
misguided, he argues, because relations between human beings are
slippery things, and ultimately resistant to study through scientific
method. Simply put, any such method would require objectivity. Yet it
is impossible to ever be fully objective about a process in which you
are yourself a participant. The analytic principles you would apply in
the natural sciences are not legitimate for this purpose because
you'll never have perfect information about the ongoing processes in
which you are yourself participating and, more importantly, you'll
never be able to completely remove your own bias from the analysis.
The solution to this philosophical problem, Soros argues, is to
introduce reflexivity into our analysis. Reflexivity requires us to
lower our expectations about what we can claim to know about human
affairs. Making absolute predictions about future performance, for
example, is impossible because any assumptions upon which such
predictions might be based are necessarily incomplete, and tentative.
Yet it is not enough simply to resolve this issue on an esoteric or
philosophical level. For we have 'bet the farm,' so to speak, on a
global financial system built around a set of non-reflexively
developed assumptions. Namely, the assumptions of economic theory.
As a science of human relations, economics proves its worth by
identifying generalizable patterns of human behavior over time. To do
so, however, it necessarily relies on metaphor to limit the complexity
of the things it sees. Take for example the fundamental argument of
classic economic theory, that supply and demand always tend towards
'equilibrium' in the long run. The idea is that, with good enough
information, the unrestrained pursuit of self-interests will always
lead to an optimal allocation of resources.
As a functional metaphor for economic analysis, the idea of economic
equilibrium may hold up for long periods of time. Yet it should not be
accepted as dogma. For what are these concepts, of supply and demand?
How are they made?
Economics says we have, each of us, inbuilt or 'given' outcome
preferences. These are our most fundamental and timeless traits
because they are so deeply embedded in our human nature. Now,
certainly, if we really possessed such enduring traits then our
analytical dilemma would be over. For these preferences would make our
behavior in different contexts predictable, following basic laws of
cause and effect over time. The problem, however, is that in financial
markets the participants are not passive entities. They are reflexive
beings, with capacities both as actors (agents of change) and
observers (agents of knowledge). And given that each capacity has the
potential to influence the other, those fundamental traits posed by
economic science appear anthropologically specious.
If we are reflexive beings then the premise that we engage in the
market in a purely rational fashion appears somewhat overstated. For
where rational actors adapt their expectations to new information in
order to maximize their interests, reflexive beings develop beliefs
which, if held collectively, can create fundamental shifts in the
nature of the market itself.
Contrary to economic equilibrium theory then, we find that actors do
not approach the market from a position of externality, with preformed
preferences, ever-adapting to new information about their position
relative to an ideal point of equilibrium. Beliefs and perceptions,
not expectations, are what we really need to be thinking about.
Beliefs literally 'constitute' the economic system (and, I would
argue, far more than even Soros lets on!).
So what does all of this mean for the current debt crisis? Well, Soros
is clear here. The emergence of a new set of beliefs about the market
is more than a mere reflection of what is going on 'out there', more
than a mere change in expectations. Instead, it is an event with
significance for the market itself. It can fundamentally re-write the
basic narrative metrics that actors use to describe risk.
Soros goes through a series of booms and busts to show how well his
theory holds up: the Conglomerate Boom of the 1960s, the 1980s
International Banking Crisis, the late-90s Asian Financial Crisis,
etc. At each point, his model is used to show that the market and its
participants were engaged in reflexive behavior conditioned by certain
basic understandings of what was 'normal' in the game. In the 1980s,
for example, the creditworthiness of borrowers and the willingness of
the debtors to lend were involved. But the creditworthiness of Mexico
was not a 'real' thing in its own right. Rather, as it turned out,
Mexican creditworthiness *mattered* historically only to the extent
that it existed in the heads of the independent banks who narrated it.
And they narrated it as 'just fine' all the way to the bust. That is,
the "moment of truth" where "reality can no longer sustain the
exaggerated expectations" (66). Indeed, even at this moment they did
not necessarily 'correct' their behavior. Like lemmings over a cliff,
beliefs can drive the market often far, far on, past the moment of
truth, and into calamity. "As long as the music is playing, you've got
to get up and dance," as Soros cites Chuck Prince, the CXO of Citibank
(84). It turns out, then, that there is little that is rational in the
process at all.
So how about today's situation? In the current conjecture, are prices
just a reflection of reality or are they effecting reality? Soros
argues the latter. As he says, equilibrium is an ever "moving
target" (72). And in this sense markets are always wrong. But
sometimes they are more wrong than others. And you know you are in one
of those moments when "some form of credit or leverage and some kind
of misconception or misinterpretation" start to radically skew our
economic affairs (78).
The current crisis is unlike any that has occurred before. Namely
because it involves two bubbles, not just one. While the US mortgage
crisis is the immediate "trigger" bubble, another "longer-term super-
bubble" is by far the more important of the two. For where the
misconception driving the property boom was that "the value of
collateral is not affected by the willingness to lend," the super-
bubble is driven by a more foundational issue: "market
fundamentalism," the desire to extend the principles of laissez-faire
economics to the entire domain of human global activity (91).
Soros goes into some detail about the ideology behind the super-
bubble, and the development over time of a range of 'synthetic'
securities of such complexity that they were beyond the understanding
even of the regulators. Nevertheless, believing in the myth of market
equilibrium, the regulators confidently abdicated their responsibility
to investigate these instruments. All too casually, as we now know,
they assumed the market would automatically correct any excesses.
How does Soros propose we remedy the situation? Case-by-case solutions
are required. But at the general level, he argues, we need a more
cautionary approach to the use of leverage. If creditors can expect to
be continuously bailed out by central banks when their willingness to
lend gets them in trouble then regulators should exact a price for
this. And the public should support this, too. For given that the US
housing market is especially unlikely to bottom out on its own any
time soon, it is clear that the costs of this breakdown will dwarf the
costs of the regulative regime that might have prevented it.
What are we to make of these arguments? Critical social science
theorists will not find anything particularly new or innovative in
this text. But the books importance lies not simply in what it is
saying, but who is saying it. This is not the sort of radical free-
market ideology you would expect from a financial speculator. And
while I am not an economist, I am nevertheless fascinated that someone
like Soros should start to enter into the realm of social science
philosophy for guidance on the operations of economic markets.
Obviously enough, this book won't be put on any freshmen economics
course reading lists. On the one hand, its just too incendiary - I
can't imagine many economists would want their students to read about
why the most essential assumptions about economic science are
perniciously wrong. On the other, its a little too self-indulgent. But
no surprise there. Its not an academic book, and its not meant to be.
After all, these are the critical musings of a multi-billionaire with
an enormous ego and little personally at stake.
Yet I can't help but feel that this book ought to be read. If for no
other reason than it gives us some pause to reflect on just how much
power we have given to the operative assumptions of economics. We have
essentially abandoned vast tracts of the public sphere to market-based
governance in the hope that it will arrange optimally efficient
outcomes. Moreover, perversely, we tend to think that any effort to to
re-regulate any of these lending practices would be incommensurate
with the values of democracy. But just how democratic is a way of life
governed by the logic of casino capitalism?
Economists say they are simply scientists telling us the truth about
ourselves. But they are so much more than that. When they teach us
that we are market-based creatures, they are creating a powerful
metaphor about man's nature, and passing it off as a universal
'truth'. Warranted by their status as 'scientists', this truth works
to erect limits on the horizon of questions we may be permitted to ask
legitimately about what life is and what it is for. It is to this
deeply political question that Soros wishes to draw our attention. And
if he is right that we are witnessing the end of the current economic
era, one can only hope that his message will get a fair hearing as we
move to debate the terms of whichever system of exchange emerges to
replace it.
Sincerely,
Nicholas
# distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission
# <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism,
# collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets
# more info: http://mail.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l
# archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime {AT} kein.org