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<nettime> An essay on "New media egologies"
Juan Martín Prada on Sun, 8 Jan 2017 21:00:32 +0100 (CET)


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<nettime> An essay on "New media egologies"


Hi nettimers, I hope you find this article interesting... 
Thanks!! 


NEW MEDIA EGOLOGIES*

Juan Martín Prada

* This text was written during a research stay at the Centre for the Study
of the Networked Image (London South Bank University). I would like to thank
the center staff and its directors, Andrew Dewdney and Annet Dekker, for
their valuable help.Text originally published in Re-visiones, num. 6 (2016).
http://www.re-visiones.net/ojs/index.php?journal=RE-VISIONES&page=article&op
=view&path%5B%5D=169&path%5B%5D=201


  For a long time, joy has passed by the image. However, today we would have
to further specify that statement by saying that joy, in our times, usually
passes by the selfie, by the ?ego-photo?. Today, we are all forced to take
self-portraits in order to interact socially, or to socialise our ideas or
intentions, thus giving way to a highly interesting line of anthropological
research. This is also true for the field of contemporary art, when
focussing on the possibilities that emerge from the analysis of the forms of
personal self-projection, in the ways by which we let ourselves be seen.
Never before, of course, had we ever been subjected to such an intense
process of self-designing our own exteriority. Therefore, those questions
about the staging of the self and its corresponding fictions have become the
key theme of many art projects, committed to researching forms of identity
management and self-representations; these are ?poetics of connectivity?
that, in multiple forms, raise the issue of how, today, what we could
perhaps denominate the ?capitalism of identity? is very much underway. .

  The advent of technologies and services typical of web 2.0, at the
beginning of the 21st century, put an end to those 70s and 80s cyberpunk
dystopias in which many envisioned the future (i.e. our present), based on
simulations, avatars, virtual bodies and cyborgs. Essentially, things ended
up going in a completely different direction. The expansion of the
participatory model of the web 2.0, with the proliferation of blogs,
microblogging services, social networks and video and image sharing
platforms entailed a radical return to ?reality?. Those envisioned worlds of
sophisticated virtuality, 3D avatars, posthuman bodies and digital
simulations, all gave way to this return to concrete people and lives, to
the singularity of someone, with a name and surname, with a history, who
shares, who speaks openly about their life. We witnessed the return to a
?self? that expresses itself, that thinks aloud, that shares everything, its
ideas, its opinions, its confessions.

  Today, on the social networks, we are permanently required to ?play the
role of ourselves?, with Kafkian echoes(1). This is total inclusivity that,
nonetheless, as a project, we should not forget that comes from way back. In
1758, Jean Jacques Rousseau, in his Letter to D?Alambert, tried to have
theatrical plays replaced by public festivals: 

?Plant a stake crowned with flowers in the middle of a square; gather the
people together there, and you will have a festival. Do better yet; let the
spectators become an entertainment to themselves; make them actors
themselves? (Rousseau, 1960, pp. 125-26). 

  In our online presence we have to be, at all times, capable of
demonstrating that we are the possessors of our ?own? life. And as
paradoxical as it might seem, it would appear that, on the network, life
only becomes your own when it has been shared, as if nothing would actually
be worthwhile if it is not shared as an image, if it does not take on that
distributed and circulatory dimension that makes it the object of a
collective expectation. 

  Impelled by the dominant logic of broadcast yourself, that almost
everybody has now interiorised, we never stop communicating and sharing. We
live online like in a glass house. A situation where any analysis forces us
to remember certain long-gone enthusiasm that we otherwise believed extinct:

?To live in a glass house is a revolutionary virtue par excellence. It is
also an intoxication, a moral exhibitionism, that we badly need. Discretion
concerning one?s own existence, once an aristocratic virtue, has become more
and more an affair of petty-bourgeois parvenus? (Benjamin, 2005, p. 209).  

  Just like the rooms of that hotel that Benjamin recalls, occupied by
?members of a sect who had sworn never to occupy closed rooms? (ibid. p.
209) in the world of pervasive and ubiquitous connectivity there can but
take place an exercise of permanent visibility, of rooms with doors only
half-closed. Hence, today, we are probably better defined by the little that
we do not reveal, as opposed to by what we do openly share. Therefore, the
title of a recent installation by the art colective Knaggi seems highly
pertinent: Would you still love me if I showed you my browser history?
(2015) (2). 

  Today we want to fill the space on the networks with our own presence. An
exhibition space characterized by a communicative hypertrophy, a tendency to
excess that, nonetheless, may have always been part of the cultural genetics
of the western world. In this regard, it may be advisable to bring up that
fragment from Lévi-Strauss?s Structural Anthropology, published in 1958: 

?Among us, language is used in a rather reckless way? we talk all the time,
we ask questions about many things. This is not at all a universal
situation. There are cultures? and I am inclined to say most of the cultures
of the world ? which are rather thrifty in relation to language. They don?t
believe that language should be used indiscriminately, but only in certain
specific frames of reference and somewhat sparingly? (Lévi Strauss, 1963. p.
68). 

  Amid the extreme intensification of the communicative exercise that we are
now living through, that old assertion would seem to be pushed to its limit,
i.e. that which aimed to define a potential postmodern ontology: the being
is not, but it comes to being in communication; the being is not, but it
?occurs? in the communicative act. 

 In this tangle of communicative habits and affective interactions, driven
by more or less impulsive exercises of the spontaneous and continuous
expression of ideas and feelings, of the intensive declaration of opinions,
judgments, and personal evaluations, we are faced with the need to bring
back an old term for this debate: confession. 

  On reality TV shows, the diary room or ?confessional? is a fundamental
dispositive in articulating their own distinct forms of hyper-reality, its
history being, nonetheless, one that is linked to the ?truth?. It is worth
remembering that St Augustine?s Confesiones (4th century AD) sparked a whole
line of actions in which self-exploration, confession, and introspection
through language would be the suitable medium for reaching ?the truth?. In
his well-known text Les Confessions (written between 1765 and 1770),
Rousseau - another ardent advocate of the practice of confession - wrote a
sentence that still reverberates strongly today, noting the kind of
satisfaction that comes from carrying out a duty or satisfying a need: ?I
will (?) loudly proclaim, thus have I acted; these were my thoughts; such
was I? (Rousseau, 2015, p. 15). Without a doubt, this may well be the
eventual epitaph of many social network users.

  It may seem that in the current communicative hypertrophy, particular to
today?s  network, everything comes down to language, everything is
publicised, exteriorised, and, in fact, there are those who argue that
showing or telling everything online is not lacking in therapeutic effects.
Regarding this it may be of interest to go over what Breuer wrote in Studies
on Hysteria (1895): 

?Telling things is a relief; it discharges tension (..) If the excitation is
denied this outlet it is sometimes converted into a somatic phenomenon, just
as is the excitation belonging to traumatic affects. The whole group of
hysterical phenomena that originate in this way may be described, with
Freud, as hysterical phenomena of retention? (Breuer, 2000, p. 211).
 
  Viktor E. Frankl commented in his Ärztliche Seelsorge (1966) that what
psychotherapy purported to be, especially psychoanalysis, was ?a secular
confession? (Frankl, 2012, p. 333). Indeed, Breuer had considered exemplary
of the effort of this spoken-word communication the Roman Catholic
confessional, calling it ?one of the basic factors of a major historical
institution? (Breuer 2000, p. 211) but also bearing in mind that ?an
amusingly exaggerated picture of the urge to do this is given in the story
of Midas's barber, who spoke his secret aloud to the reeds? (ibid). From
this very comicality, it would be tempting to search for certain
correlations between the psychoanalyst?s couch and the walls on
socialnetworks. A simile which could be backed up by the fact that, both on
the couch and on the networks, those who listen cannot look you in the
eye(3). As Lacan reminded us in 1964, such analysis can never be done ?face
to face? (Lacan, 1987, p. 85). 

  For many Internet users, there is no single impulse or idea that should
not be made social or public; every idea, thought or whim is manifested, it
is exteriorised, it becomes language in images. Everything seems to find
satisfaction in the field of representation, in performing for the camera,
no matter how absurd the adopted configurations may look. In reality, the
success and extreme attraction that many ?youtubers? arouse in their
millions of followers could be due to how free they are. After all, human
beings love whatever carries the image of freedom, and we always admire
those who are able to exercise it (going even further, the Romantic poets
went as far as to say that beauty was not but ?freedom in appearance?). In
effect, this exercise of hyperexhibition on the networks, which sometimes
generates millions of followers, is for the most part just a release from
ties and social conventions. It reveals what many of us usually try not to
evince but, secretly, as devoted online voyeurs, we perhaps enjoy watching
it appear in the other: an extreme relaxing of conventions, obscenity,
rudeness, ignorance, or, quite simply, stupidity. 

  It has often been criticised how, in the new media egologies with which
the world seems to have become little more than the correlative effect of
what ?I percieve?, ?I feel?, ?I think? the danger of an emotional reduction
in the shared social reality is denoted. An ?I? that, as a new Narcissus,
tries to get to know itself by permanently reflecting itself in the mirrored
surface of its computer screen. As if we were now only interested in the
world as the stage upon which to unfurl our own emotions, as if reality were
becoming a mere reflection of the self, in a new primacy of what Richard
Sennet called a psychomorphic vision of reality (Sennet, 1979).

  The Internet certainly does tend to act as a mirror. The act of browsing
is becoming more and more like looking at ourselves in a mirrored surface,
in which we always come across our own affinities, with the phantasmatic
images of our desires, our preferences, our curiosities. On the social
networks, we find what is liked by people like us, those who we have
categorised as ?friends?. Furthermore, and at the mercy of ?cookies? and
many other systems that track our preferences and interests, online
navigation is more and more personalised; as soon as we have shown interest
in anything on an online store, we will henceforth see images of it
everywhere in our online navigation, in dozens of ads and in diverse forms
and typologies. This is the power of the mechanisms of customised
information, oriented to offer us images of our own objects of interest. We
live in a more and more sophisticated ?filter bubble?(4) based on algorithms
that the internet companies use to offer us everything that, according to
their predictions, should interest us based on our navigation habits. 

  The mirrored action of the Internet does not of course operate like a
mirror, which, as Louis Aragon said, ?can reflect but cannot see?(5). On the
contrary, the mirror-web would in fact be more like a new kind of ?mirror
with memory?(6), able to remember our online wanderings, our likes, our
interests, our tastes. Increasingly, everything is oriented towards
?shutting ourselves? into our own individual personal information bubble
(Pariser, 2011), made up by filters that adapt to our own ideological
affinities and specific fields of interest and consumption. Online browsing
is already unique to each one of us, a personal ecosystem, always generating
the dangerous effect that only the things related to us exist. And this is
just the beginning. This automatic prediction of our interests will push
back, to a secondary plane in our perceptive field, anything that will
apparently not interest us, going far beyond the kind of personalisation
anticipated long ago by Nicholas Negroponte in ?Daily me?(7). 

  It would appear that in the network-system there is a very literal
materialisation, a kind of unintended caricature, of what the early 19th
century German idealists contended - i.e. that the individual?s exterior
world was no more than an accident of his own being. That which Schopenhauer
exemplified in his quoting of some of Byron?s verses: ?Are not the
mountains, waves, and skies as much a part of me, as I of them??(8).It was a
question of understanding the cognizant being as the bearer of the world and
of all objective existence, the latter in turn being presented as dependent
on its own existence. In fact, Schopenhauer greatly critised Kant for not
having counted as the first of the forms dependent on cognition per se -
i.e. time, space and causality ? the ?being-object-for-a-subject?, since
this would be, as Schopenhauer stated, ?the first and most general form
pertaining to all phenomena? (Schopenhauer, 2016, p.217).

  As perverse and ironic as it may be, let us accept today the kind of
parodic materialisation, albeit reductively literal, of those Fichtean
considerations in the media landscape of the networks. This way, we can
refer to them exactly as objects-for-a-subject, phenomena that are sustained
by that singular subject on which they rely, ever performing in a pervasive
process of singularisation, of individualisation, of adaptation to that
unique, singular self (but at the same time common and statistically
predictable by means of ?datafication? and algorithmic processing of their
life) that provides them with ?support?. A fluid image of ourselves and of
our affinities is what the net gives back to us at every moment, trapping us
therein, in a space of ?flickering images? that absorb us. 

  More a straightforward means to an end than an actual medium, social
networks are therefore becoming enormously addictive, turning screens into
new paralysing gorgons. Nevertheless, looking at internet users? fixed
expressions, so engrossed by the magical light of their computer screens and
other such networked devices, this light shining out from a gleaming,
radiant mirror, could lead us to rethink the notion of ?illumination? (a key
theme, for example, in Evan Baden?s series, The Illuminati 2006/07), if only
to draw attention, critically, to the hypnotic unconsciousness of that
illumination(9). It could even be said that what illuminates the faces of
those absorbed internet users, subjected to constant impressions, is the
light that emanates from the enthralling dynamism of the connected multitude
itself. Indeed, the metaphors about the energeia of the multitude are
fascinating, long starring that individual who ?plunges into the crowd as
into a reservoir of electric energy? (Benjamin, 2006. p. 191).

  Undoubtedly, surfing social networks or being carried along with the flow
of the multitude as they walk through the streets is always pleasant and
entertaining: ?any man who (?) is bored in the midst of the crowd, is a
fool! A fool! And despise him!? said Guys (Baudelaire, 2010, p. 80).

  Therefore, concentrating on all our forms of inclusion in the connected
multitude, and its highly powerful presence, exploring it poetically by
means of images, is an ongoing aspiration for many artists today. Therefore,
and lest we forget it, our history, the history of the western world, may
not be but the history of how the life of the multitude was constructed.
This point is probably where the most interesting aspect of the ?poetics of
connectivity? resides: to prove that uniqueness today takes the form of the
multitude, that the unique now tries to present itself in the form of the
multitude.  

  Internet culture does indeed have its detractors, and their most accurate
critiques are aimed at, precisely, a questioning of what this mirrored
condition really does for us. Zygmunt Bauman recently stated that ?many
people use social networks not to come together, not to extend their
horizons, but, on the contrary, to shut themselves in what I call comfort
zones, where the only sound they hear is the echo of their own voice, where
they only see the reflections of their own face(10). Others conceive the
Internet experience as the concretisation of the worst-made plans of a
globalised ochlocracy, in which only the primitivisation or infantilisation
of thought would prevail, dominated by visual, ?mosaic? thinking(11), that
always subjects us to saturating simultaneities, to mere disjunctions, and
with which the most complex syntactic operators and subordinations would be
ignored, reducing every interpretation to a ?like? or a ?dislike?. An era in
which we would live a pervasive need for expression and being listened to, a
need to speak, perhaps not so much to communicate but rather to merely make
oursleves present, heading towards the primacy of the phatic function of
language. This function, that allows us to keep a conversation going without
stating any real concrete message(12), would also lead our use of images
today. In effect, many of the images that circulate on social networks only
take part in this mission, as they are merely shared to highlight the
continuity of the individual in the process of online communication, being
revitalising elements of the state of social connectivity. In the field of
the image this has striking effects, contributing, for example, to how
photography stops being an attempt at a special vision of reality (except in
those cases in which there are ?artistic? aspirations), to become a record
of the ?normal vision? (Ascott, 1996, p. 168), of the everyday language of
seeing, of the ordinary gaze. In this sense, it seems appropriate to recall
José van Dijck?s assertion: 

?the camera phone merges oral and visual modalities - the latter seemingly
adapting to the former. Pictures become more like spoken language as
photographs are turning into the new currency for social interaction? (van
Dijck, 2007, p. 115)

  In fact, as a result of this, it would also be possible to consider a
philosophy of the ordinary language of images (Brea 2010, p. 116), to talk
about ?acts of seeing? or ?acts of vision? (to see and to be seen), just as
Austin spoke of ?speech acts?, to thus revive a consideration of photography
as a ?natural language?. Therefore, we could say that today the value of the
image is mostly rooted in its capacity to perform as an interface, as a
merely connecting and intersubjective element. 

  But, of course, to talk about mirrors would also be to talk about those
gestures and grimaces that we all do in front of them, when nobody is
watching us, as well as the gesticulations and poses that we adopt when
facing that camera-mirror that all connective devices have become. For
instance, there has been extensive debate, and harsh criticism, of the
pouting smiles, the so-called ?duckface?, that many feel forced to adopt,
for some strange reason, in their selfies. But let us not get carried away -
the multitude has always been subjected to homogenising gestures, to a rigid
catalogue of postural coercions. In the text The Man of the Crowd (1840),
Allan Poe alluded to a certain ?absent and overdone smile upon their lips?,
(Poe, 2008, p. 295) present in the faces of pedestrians when other people
get in their way. Regarding this, Benjamin would ironically state that
?Those smiles provide food for thought? (Benjamin, 1973, p. 127); smiles
that everybody who moves through the crowd would have to adopt ?as a mimetic
shock absorber? (ibid. p. 133) and that probably, in his opinion, was not so
different to the phrase ?keep smiling?, that we are still subjected to in
our visual interactions on the social networks.  

  How we adapt to the camera, in a world crowded by visual registration
devices, again becomes an important issue in artistic creation, a question
whose topicality is testified by a numerous exhibitions and curatorial
projects on this topic (13). Certainly, a key trend in current artistic
creation is based on exploring the possibilities of an extreme phenomenology
of the being on camera, of the self in front of the camera, as occurs, for
example, in Ryan Trecartin and Lizzie Fitch?s videos and installations.
These are trends that compel us to remember the origins of this artistic
thematisation of performing or being for the camera, especially its most
extreme moments, such as the monologue-action called Theme Song (1973) by
Vito Acconci, a video performance in which the camera became a medium to
connect with a future spectator to whom Accoci?s monologue was directed, a
spectator whose absence permitted the artist to achieve a certain intimacy
and isolation only intensified by the presence of that impulsive technical
eye. Such investigations explore the being-on-camera, or for the camera. In
this regard, Rosalind Krauss defended, precisely, the viability of
generalising narcissism as a condition of the entire genre of video art.
Another good example would be Richard Serra and Nancy Holt?s video
performance entitled Boomerang (1974). In this piece, Holt's words were fed
back to her through headphones with a one-second delay, delayed echoes of
her own voice. During this performance, Holt said that ?I am surrounded by
me?. And today, the same is surely happening to on the networks; we are more
and more surrounded by ourselves, everything reaches us as echoes of our own
processes of online projection and staging, of our anxiety to let ourselves
be seen.

  Hence, from the new visual poetics of connectivity, we expect not only the
embodiment of our life?s conditions in the network culture, but, above all,
the aperture of new paths to explore in the critical thematisation of the
impact of the Internet in the processes of subjetivisation. Furthermore, we
will also see more research into the ability of connective devices to act as
the main articulatory elements of the new communicative, social, and
productive practices of our times, in their inmense power to generate new
forms of pleasure and new dependencies. But, above all, we should trust
their capability to highlight, in a world dominated by the slogan ?be
yourself?, authentic modes of difference in these times in which this
over-inflated term acts as a requirement for absolute standardisation, and
in which everything seems to consist of pervasive corporate practices of
false differentiation. 



Bibliographical references: 

Aragon, L. (1963), ?Le contre-chant?. In Le fou d'Elsa, Paris: Editions
Gallimard.
 
Ascott, R. (1996), ?Photography at the Interface?. In T. Druckrey (Ed.),
Electronic Culture, Denville: Aperture

Barthes, R. (1980) La Chambre claire: Note sur la photographie, Paris:
Gallimard/Seuil/Cahiers du cinéma.

Baudelaire, Ch, (2010) The painter of modern life, London: Penguin books. 

Benjamin W. (1972), Iluminaciones II, Madrid: Taurus. 

Benjamin (2005) Selected Writings, 1927-1930, Michael W. Jennings, Howard
Eiland and Gary Smith (eds.) Vol 2. Part 1, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and
London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 

Benjamin, W. (1929), Der Surrealismus. (trad. cast.: El Surrealismo: La
última instancia de la Inteligencia Europea. En Iluminaciones I, Madrid:
Taurus, 1971.

Benjamin, W. (2005), Libro de los pasajes, Madrid: Akal. 

Benjamin, W. (2006), The Writer of Modern Life: Essays on Charles
Baudelaire, Cambridge (Mass.) and London: The Belknap of Harvard University
Press. 

Benjamin, W. (1973), Charles Baudelaire: A lyric poet in the era of High
capitalism, London: Verso.

Bourdieu, P. (2003), Un arte medio. Ensayo sobre los usos sociales de la
fotografía (1969), Barcelona: Gustavo Gili, 2003.

Brea, J. L. (2010), Las tres eras de la imagen, Madrid: Akal, 2010. 

Breuer J. and Freud, S. (2000), Studies on Hysteria, New York: Basic Books. 

Byron, G. G., (1828), The Works of Lord Byron: Including the Suppressed
Poems, París: A. y W. Galignani. 

De Querol, R. (2016), Interview with Sigmund Bauman, Babelia, El País, 9th
January.

Debray, R. (1991), Vie et mort de l'image. Une histoire du regard en
Occident, París: Gallimard (Bibliothèque des idées).

Frank, V. E., (2012), Psicoanálisis y existencialismo, Mexico City: Fondo de
Cultura Económica.

Freud, S. (1958), The standard edition of the complete psychological works
of Sigmund Freud, London: The Hogarth Press.

Husserl, E. (1931), Meditations Cartesiennes: Introduction à la
phenomenologie, Paris: Armand Collin. 

Kafka, F. (1987), ?El gran teatro integral de Oklahoma?. In América,
Barcelona: Orbis.

Lacan, J. (1987) Los Cuatro Conceptos fundamentales del Psicoanálisis (1964)
Barcelona, Buenos Aires, Mexico: Paidós. 

Levi Strauss (1963), Structural Anthropology, New York: Basic books. 

Malinowski, B. (1972), Phatic Communion. In J. Laver and S. Hutcheson (eds.)
Communication in Face-to-face interaction, Harmondworth: Penguin Books.

Martín Prada, J. (2012), Prácticas artísticas e Internet en la época de las
redes sociales, Madrid: Akal. 

Negroponte, N. (1995), Being Digital, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

Pariser, E. (2011), The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You,
New York: Penguin Press. 

Poe, E. A. (2008), Annotated and Illustrated Entire Stories and Poems,
Bottletree Books. 

Rousseau, J. J. (2015), The Confessions, The Project Gutenberg.

Rousseau, J. J. (1960), Politics and the arts, Letter to M. D?Alambert on
the Theatre, (ed. Allan Bloom), Free Press. 

Sennett, R. (1979), El declive del hombre público, Barcelona: Península.

Schopenhauer, A. (2016), The World as Will and Presentation, Vol. 1, New
York: Routledge. 

Van Dijck, J. (2007), Mediated Memories in the Digital Age, Stanford:
Stanford University Press. 

Wendell Holmes, O. (1859). ?The Stereoscope and the Stereograph?. The
Atlantic Monthly 3 (June).



NOTES: 

1. Kafka wrote in The Man who Disappeared (America) ?Everyone is welcome!
Anyone who wants to become an artist should apply! We are the theater that
can use everyone, a place for everyone!?, New York: Oxford University Press,
2012, p. 195.
2. Would you still love me if I showed you my browser history?, permanent
installation at The Nordic Council of Ministers, Copenhagen.
3. Freud wrote in "On Beginning the Treatment (further recommendations on
the technique of psycho-analysis I)? (1913) the following: ?I hold to the
plan of getting the patient to lie on a sofa while I sit 'behind him out of
his sight. This arrangement has a historical basis; it is the remnant of the
hypnotic method out of which psycho-analysis was evolved. But it deserves to
be maintained for many reasons?. (The standard edition of the complete
psychological works of Sigmund Freud, London: The Hogarth Press, 1958, p.
135.) 
4. See E. Pariser The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You,
New York: Penguin Press, 2011. It is of great interest how the artistic
thematisation of this notion was dealt with in the show ?Filter Bubble,?
curated by Simon Castets and Hans Ulrich Obrist, at LUMA (Zürich) in 2016.
5. L. Aragon, ?Le contre-chant? (1963), Le fou d'Elsa, Paris: Editions
Gallimard.
6. I employ here the sentence that Oliver Wendell Holmes used to describe
the stereoscope in 1859. See Wendell Holmes (1859), ?The Stereoscope and the
Stereograph?, The Atlantic Monthly 3 (June), p. 738-48.
7. See N. Negroponte (1995), Being Digital, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
8. The Works of Lord Byron: Including the Suppressed Poems, París: A. y W.
Galignani, Paris, 1828, p. 64.
9. For more about the notion of ?profane illumination? see W. Benjamin
(1983), Das Passagen-Werk, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
10. Interview with Zygmunt Bauman, by Ricardo de Querol, Babelia, El País,
9th January 2016.
11. The term ?mosaic thinking? was coined by M. Mcluhan in his text ?The
Brain and the Media: The ?Western? Hemisphere?, published in December 1978 .
12. See B. Malinowski (1972) ?Phatic Communion?, in J. Laver y S. Hutcheson
(eds.) Communication in Face-to-face interaction, Harmondworth: Penguin
Books.
13. Of particular interest is the show ?Performing for the Camera?, curated
by S. Baker for Tate Modern, 2016.


Text originally published in Re-visiones, num. 6 (2016).
http://www.re-visiones.net/ojs/index.php?journal=RE-VISIONES&page=article&op
=view&path%5B%5D=169&path%5B%5D=201



 



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