<nettime> Divvy up and rule?

[Brian Holmes via nettime-l <nettime-l@lists.nettime.org>]

A groundswell of anti-corruption, pro-redistribution claims has been
driving US electoral politics for months, and now similar conflicts have
exploded on the streets of Europe. The similarity and simultaneity of the
democracy struggles is amazing. Giant vocal sectors of the population, led
by youth, are demanding a reversal of neoliberal social policy.

But the shared threat is equally amazing: police or even military
repression in the short run, institution or intensification of fascism
next.

Meanwhile, Trump and Musk are abandoning Ukraine, and an emboldened Putin
has called for a meeting with Xi and Trump in China - presumably to divvy
up the world into spheres of influence (see snips from Guardian article
below). This would fulfill Trump's longstanding geopolitical vision. But he
is being totally played. The result, already unfolding, is the functional
collapse of US liberal empire (free trade, open sea lanes, military
alliances, nuclear umbrella - for the short list).

So, with slow-burn climate change pushed to the background, I guess the
three current arenas of global crisis are redistributive democracy,
geopolitical power and don't forget the specter of uncontrollable
job-killing infrastructure-wrecking AI (patched your PHP code anyone?).

My p(doom) for American democracy is 70%, but I'm somewhat utopian. What do
y'all say for Europe?

***

As Trump’s time runs out, this could be his most dangerous legacy: a world
divided into three
Steve Bloomfield

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/oct/24/donald-trump-world-three-summit-vladimir-putin-xi-jinping

[..snip..]

On top of a reckless war in the Middle East and appeasement in Europe, the
shadow of a new world order is emerging, which Trump will relentlessly
pursue in his final years. Putin has proposed a summit between himself,
Trump and China’s Xi Jinping, to be held in China next month.

Such an unprecedented meeting, were it to take place, would have
potentially devastating consequences for the rest of us. The three leaders
have ambitions to transform the way the world is governed, essentially
dividing it into spheres of influence. One summit wouldn’t turn an idea
into reality, but it would send us down a very dangerous path. In Europe,
it would have an impact beyond Ukraine if the US refused to help protect
nations threatened by Russia. In east Asia, the withdrawal of the American
security blanket would cause enormous problems for Taiwan, South Korea and
Japan, as well as Australia.

We’ve talked a lot about the end of the west over the past two years – this
feels like a moment when many of those fears will crystalise.

The Trump administration’s ambition to divide the world into spheres and
side with dictators over democrats has long been evident. Last year’s
National Security Strategy was deeply critical of the US’s traditional
allies in Europe and east Asia. But it was what it didn’t say that was most
shocking. Both Russia and China avoided direct criticism. In six paragraphs
describing the threat to Taiwan, China was not mentioned once. Elsewhere in
the document, China was actually praised as “rich and powerful … us[ing]
its wealth and power to its considerable advantage.” The section on
Russia’s war in Ukraine failed to mention how it started and did not
suggest that Putin should be defeated; instead it focused on how the US
could help Europe and Russia mend their relationship. The 33-page document
discussed the importance of the US controlling the western hemisphere, but
made clear that so long as the US still had economic dominance, it cared
little whether other parts of the world are protected. “The affairs of
other countries,” it stated, “are our concern only if their activities
directly threaten our interests.” For too long, it argued, America’s allies
had “suck[ed] us into conflicts and controversies central to their
interests but peripheral or irrelevant to our own”.

For Putin, this is a success almost three decades in the making. He has
long viewed American support for democracy in eastern Europe and central
Asia as “interference” in Russia’s backyard. Now he has a US president who
agrees. Trump has also placed Putin on a far higher pedestal than Russia’s
economy and its technological prowess deserves.

Xi, too, has welcomed the US’s rhetorical retreat from east Asia,
particularly if it allows China greater maritime control in the East China
Sea and South China Sea. World opinion on China has dramatically improved
as that of the US has slid. As Chrystia Freeland, a former Canadian foreign
minister, put it this week, “there has not been a president who has been
more beneficial for China than Donald Trump”.

At stake is not merely territorial control. All three governments see the
possibility of increasing economic ties. For the US and China, the bigger
issues are future control of economic supply chains and technology
platforms, while Russia’s fossil fuel resources are also a factor. All
three are key players in the next space race, both in terms of commercial
and military control. If these three nations begin to work together, at the
expense of Europe and the rest of the world, it will fundamentally change
the nature of geopolitics. A decade ago, talk of a multipolar world was
based around the idea of the US, China and the European Union as the three
most powerful blocs. Somehow, Brussels has been replaced by Moscow.

[...]

    Steve Bloomfield is the former international editor of the Observer
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